Christie A. LIMPERT, Vivian J. Fonteboa, Vincent Valle, Jr., Queen Smith, William A. Schober, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff(s), v. CAMBRIDGE CREDIT COUNSELING CORP., Cambridge Credit Corp., Cambridge/Brighton Budget Planning Corp. n/k/a/ CB Budget Planning Corp., Brighton Credit Management Corp., Brighton Credit Corp., Brighton Credit Corp. of Massachusetts, Brighton Debt Management Services, Ltd., Debt Relief Clearinghouse, Ltd., Cypress Advertising and Promotions, Inc., First Consumer Credit Management Corp., John Puccio, Richard Puccio and Robert Henle, P.C., Defendant(s) CV 03-5986 (TCP) (WDW) United States District Court, E.D. New York Signed May 15, 2006 Counsel G. Oliver Koppell, John F. Duane, Paul E. Kerson, Koppell, Leavitt, Kerson & Duane, LLP, Daniel Feist Schreck, Law Offices of G. Oliver Koppell, Joseph S. Tusa, Whalen & Tusa, P.C., New York, NY, Garrett M. Smith, Michie Hamlett Lowry Rasmussen & Tweel PLLC, Gregory S. Duncan, Charlottesville, VA, David J. Vendler, Morris Polich & Purdy LLP, Los Angeles, CA, C. Allison Powell, C. Allison Powell, P.C., Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff(s). Brian J. Davis, Law Office of Brian J. Davis, Garden City, NY, Lawrence H. Cooke, III, William Donald McCracken, Venable LLP, New York, NY, Andrew B. Schultz, Scott M. Zucker, Scott M. Zucker, Attorney at Law, Woodbury, NY, for Defendant(s). Wall, William D., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 Before the court is the plaintiff’s application for attorney’s fees and costs previously awarded as sanctions against the defendants referred to as the “Group A” defendants, that is, Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., Brighton Credit Corp. of Massachusetts, Brighton Debt Management Services, Ltd.,[1]Debt Relief Clearinghouse, Ltd., Cypress Advertising and Promotions, Inc., John Puccio and Richard Puccio. In an earlier order [#169], the court noted that the fee application had been opposed by the law firm of Sheppard, Mullin Richter & Hampton on behalf of defendants Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., John Puccio, and Richard Puccio [#153], but no opposition had yet been received from the other Group A defendants. Thus, the court afforded those defendants a further opportunity to file opposition. On or about February 6, 2006, opposition was filed by The Law Offices of Brian Davis, Esq., on behalf of Brighton Credit Corporation of Massachusetts, Brighton Debt Management Services, Ltd., Debt Relief Clearinghouse, Ltd. and Cypress Advertising & Promotions, Ltd. [#171]. The movants' reply papers were filed on or about February 10, 2006 [#173]. After reviewing the papers, the undersigned ordered the plaintiffs to submit additional papers breaking down the amounts sought into an application for the motion to compel and a separate application for the costs associated with the production of discovery documents. [#177]. The plaintiffs filed their new papers on March 29, 2006 [#178], and opposition was filed by the Brian Davis firm on behalf of defendants Brighton Debt Management Services, Ltd., Debt Relief Clearinghouse, Ltd., Cypress Advertising and Promotions, Inc., on April 6, 2006 [#179]. The law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP filed opposition on behalf of John and Richard Puccio [#180] on April 11, 2006. No further opposition was received on behalf of defendant Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., although the docket lists Brian J. Davis as representing that entity. The plaintiffs filed reply papers on April 14, 2006 [#181]. For the reasons set forth herein, the court finds that the Group A defendants must pay the plaintiffs $50,000 in attorney’s fees, $300 in motion costs, and $15,000 in restitution for the costs associated with a second production of documents. Further, the attorneys are directed to review the docket sheet to identify and correct any errors with the attorneys of record as they appear in the current docket, for reasons explained infra. BACKGROUND This matter has an extensive history of discovery disputes. In January 2005, the plaintiffs made three motions to compel documents, each of which was granted by the court. [#80, 100, 101] In August, the court again ordered production of documents. [#101] On September 6, 2005 [#103] the defendants again moved to compel the production of documents that had been previously ordered produced and sought sanctions. [#103] In connection with that motion, the plaintiffs prepared a Declaration from Mr. Tusa detailing the procedural history of the matter and the alleged discovery violations of the defendants. A hearing was held on September 21, 2005. At that hearing, the law firm of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. (“EBG”), who represented the defendants now labeled the Group A defendants, indicated its intention to move to withdraw. No opposition to the motion to compel was entered by EBG on behalf of the Group A defendants. Two other firms indicated their intention to appear as counsel for various groupings of defendants. The court adjourned the hearing to September 29, 2005 to give the defendants time to resolve their representation issues. *2 By September 29, 2005, Brian Davis, Esq. had entered a notice of appearance on behalf of Cambridge Credit Corporation, Cambridge/Brighton Budget Planning Corporation, Brighton Credit Management Corporation, Brighton Credit Corporation and Robert Henle P.C. (the “Group B” defendants). As of that date, EBG was still the attorney of record for the Group A defendants, but entered no opposition to the motion to compel and for sanctions. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to compel as to the Group A defendants and awarded sanctions in an amount to be determined. A determination as to the Group B defendants was deferred. The court also granted EBG’s motion to withdraw and gave the Group A defendants until October 14, 2005 to secure new counsel. A hearing on the sanctions issue was scheduled for October 20, 2005. On October 6, the Sheppard Mullin firm filed a notice of appearance as counsel for Group A defendants Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., John Puccio, and Richard Puccio. [#124] On October 7, 2005, Brian Davis filed a notice of appearance for the remaining Group A defendants Brighton Credit Corporation of Massachusetts, Brighton Debt Management Services, Inc., Debt Relief Clearinghouse, Ltd. and Cypress Advertising and Promotions, Inc. [#125] On October 17, 2005, the Sheppard Mullin firm filed a motion for reconsideration of the September 29th order granting the motion to compel as to the Group A defendants and awarding sanctions. [#131] A third hearing on the sanctions motion was held on October 20, 2005, after denial of a motion to adjourn by Sheppard Mullin. At the hearing, Sheppard Mullin again asked to adjourn the sanctions motion to allow the parties to meet and confer and engage in additional document production. The court agreed and rescheduled the hearing for November 15, 2005. [#133] The court also denied the motion for reconsideration. The attorneys then engaged in the meet and confer process and the defendants made substantial productions. As part of this process, the plaintiffs agreed to electronically duplicate and re-produce to defense counsel all of the discovery produced in this lawsuit over the past years. The reason for this unusual agreement was a lien asserted by EBG, defendants' former counsel, over litigation materials in their possession that they refused to EBG refused to release to their former clients. On November 14, 2006, the plaintiffs submitted a letter in regard to the request for sanctions, and another hearing was held on November 15, 2005. At that hearing, the court held that “Plaintiffs' September 6, 2005 Rule 37 motion having previously been GRANTED, the court awards the plaintiffs costs and fees in connection with that motion as well as the costs incurred for the production of previously produced discovery.” 11/15 Tr. 17:23-18:5. The undersigned further suggested that the award of fees and costs pertained only to those parties represented by the Sheppard Mullin firm. 11/15 Tr. 18:12-17. Recognizing that that statement may have created some confusion as to precisely which parties are the subject of the sanctions order, the court, in its order of February 1, 2006, reiterated that when the undersigned stated that the costs and sanctions pertained only to the “Sheppard Mullin” defendants, the intent was to refer to all of the original Group A defendants, and not to limit the sanctions to the three defendants who subsequently retained Sheppard Mullin. The sanction stands against all of the original Group A defendants, that is, Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., Brighton Credit Corp. of Massachusetts, Brighton Debt Management Services, Inc., Debt Relief Clearinghouse, Ltd., Cypress Advertising and Promotions, Inc., John Puccio, and Richard Puccio. On or about December 20, 2005, the plaintiffs filed their original lodestar application, seeking fees for work done by two firms - Whalen & Tusa ($140,975) and the Law Offices of G. Oliver Koppell & Assocs. ($45,365)- for a total of $186,340 in attorney’s fees. They also sought costs in the amount of $752.97 incurred by Whalen & Tusa and $515.06 incurred by the Law Offices of G. Oliver Koppell & Assocs., for a total of $1,269.03. As noted earlier, after that filing, the court ordered submission of additional papers that would break down the amounts sought into separate applications for the motion to compel and for the production of discovery documents. In the new papers, the plaintiffs seek, on the motion to compel, $100,825 in fees for the Whalen & Tusa firm, along with $387.87 in costs, and $44,615 in fees for the firm of G. Oliver Koppell & Assocs., along with $516.06 in costs. The plaintiffs also seek $24,500 in attorney’s fees and $365 in costs in relation to the production of discovery documents. These amounts are attacked by the defendants as exorbitant on several grounds. John and Richard Puccio, now represented by the Akin Gump firm, also argue that they should not be required to pay any of the sanctions. DISCUSSION *3 In this Circuit, attorney’s fee awards are determined by calculating the “lodestar” figure, which is based on the number of reasonable hours expended, multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. See Cruz v. Local Union No. 3 of the Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, 34 F.3d 1148, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing F.H. Krear & Co. v. Nineteen Named Trustees, 810 F.2d 1250, 1263 (2d Cir. 1987) ). The party seeking reimbursement bears the burden of proving the reasonableness and necessity of hours spent and rates charged. See generally, New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1983). To this end, a fee application must be supported by contemporaneous time records that describe with specificity, by attorney, the nature of the work done, the hours expended, and the dates. Id. at 1147-48. The court will consider the fees and costs applied for with these standards in mind. Attorneys' Fees on the Motion to Compel: The court has reviewed the lodestar application with reference to all of the relevant factors, and finds that the amount sought must be significantly reduced. As noted in the order of March 9, the amounts sought here as sanctions for a motion to compel are staggeringly high. Although the plaintiffs have supported the number of hours spent with adequate time records, the bills are too high to be “reasonable” attorney’s fees for the motion to compel that underlies the sanctions award. The court bases this conclusion both on its review of the record and on general experience. SeeClarke v. Frank, 960 F.2d 1146, 1153 (2d Cir. 1992) (court looks to own familiarity and experience with case and general experience as well as to parties' evidentiary submissions and arguments). A court is not required to “set forth item-by-item findings concerning what may be countless objections to individual billing items,” and in making the reductions, this court will focus instead on some general factors that contribute to the very high numbers. See Lunday v. City of Albany, 42 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1994). First, the attorney’s fees for the motion to compel involve two law firms and five attorneys, including Joseph Tusa, a partner at Whalen & Tusa, billing at a rate of $500 per hour, Paul Whalen, another partner at that firm also billing at $500 per hour, G. Oliver Koppell, the name partner at his own firm, billing at $550 per hour, John Duane, a partner at the Koppell firm billing at $500 per hour, and Daniel Schreck, an associate at the Koppell firm billing at $150 per hour. While the court understands that $500 or more per hour fees are not unusual at many firms, both in the Southern and Eastern districts, the necessity of having four attorneys who bill at that rate involved in these matters is questionable. A number of courts have found that reductions are appropriate for duplicative labor, and this court finds that such a reduction is appropriate here. See Luciano v. The Olsten Corp., 109 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 1997) and cases cited therein. All four partners billed time for the preparation of the motion, for a total of approximately 94 hours.[2] The court understands that the motion involved review of numerous underlying documents so that the plaintiffs could explain to the court what had not been produced, and that Mr. Tusa’s Declaration in support contained 35 exhibits. Still, the motion itself was three pages long, involving no complex law requiring hours of research, and 94 hours is a very long time to spend in preparation of a three page motion, 35 exhibits notwithstanding. The costs, the court finds, were increased by the fact that four partners were involved. While the involvement of four partners in the motion may have been the best strategic approach for the plaintiffs, that strategic choice does not have to be paid for by the Group A defendants. *4 The same is true of the plaintiffs' attorneys' involvement in the four hearings on the motion. Of course, the multiple hearings increased the overall costs associated with the motion, but those hearings were attended by two or three attorneys, each charging $500 an hour and billing between six and eight hours for each hearing, while it was Mr. Tusa who was the primary or only active participant at the hearings. This also was duplicative labor, outside the range of what is compensable as reasonable attorney’s fees on this matter. In sum, the work done on the motion to compel involved, for the most part, three highly compensated partners too many, where one would have sufficed, with an associate helping minimally. The bulk of the work was done by the Whalen & Tusa firm, with each of the partners doing approximately $50,000 worth of work. Thus, the court will award $50,000 as reasonable attorney’s fees on the motion to compel. See Luciano, 109 F.3d at 117(district court can exclude excessive and unreasonable hours from its fee computation by making across-the-board reduction). This reduction is in no way a criticism of the work done by the plaintiffs' attorneys, which has been of high quality, but merely reflects a duplication of efforts that falls outside the realm of what is reasonably compensable on this motion. Indeed, there could be cases where the active involvement of more than one partner would be both reasonable and compensable. Costs on the Motion to Compel: In addition to attorneys' fees, the plaintiffs also seek costs. The Whalen & Tusa firm seeks $387.87 in costs consisting of $300.44 for copying and binding of the Tusa Declaration and $87.53 for car rental. The court will award $300 for the copying costs, but nothing for the car rental. The plaintiffs also seek $516.06 in costs incurred by the Koppell firm on the motion to compel. They identify these costs as $4.80 for postage, $83.26 for a teleconference and $428 for a transcript. The court will not allow any of these costs, inasmuch as there is no indication of how they are related to the motion to compel. Thus, the plaintiffs are awarded $300 in costs on the motion to compel. John and Richard Puccio’s Obligation to pay Sanctions: The newest attorneys for John Puccio and Richard Puccio have submitted a memorandum of law [#180] arguing that they should pay none or only a very small amount of the sanctions awarded against the Group A defendants. This argument was also raised in the sanctions opposition papers earlier filed by the Sheppard Mullin firm when they represented the Puccios [#153]. The gist of their argument is that the two individual defendants were not specifically accused of discovery failures and thus should not be required to pay sanctions for the discovery failures of the corporate Group A defendants. This argument was not raised in opposition to the original motion to compel and for sanctions, which was unopposed by EBG. The plaintiffs argue that it is law of the case that the Puccios were part of the Group A defendants who were found liable on the motion to compel. The court agrees and declines to revisit the issue. Attorneys' fees and costs on the re-production of discovery documents: In the supplemental application, the plaintiffs seek attorneys' fees of $4,750 for Mr. Tusa and $19,800 for Mr. Whalen in relation to the discovery re-production necessitated by EBG’s lien refusal to give the defendants the files from this action, for a total of $24,550. The plaintiffs used an electronic information system apparently already created for this litigation to duplicate the production, claiming to have attained “substantial cost savings” by doing so. Tusa Decl. ¶¶ 25-28. In his original declaration, Mr. Tusa states that the plaintiffs “have not passed along any of the attorney time or costs for completing the duplication and re-production of the discovery previously produced by the parties.” Id. ¶ 28. In the Supplemental Declaration, Mr. Tusa includes time sheets for the $24,550 in just such costs, without reference to his earlier statement. *5 The defendants argue that the court awarded the plaintiffs only the costsof the reproduction, and not attorney’s fees, and the court acknowledges that it referred only to costs, and not fees. See Mem. in Opp. at 8-9 [#153]. Nonetheless, the court agrees that the plaintiffs are, as a matter of common sense and justice, entitled to compensation for all of the reasonable costs involved in the re-production, including costs for the manpower required. Further, the costs of the re-production are not a sanction, but compensation for a job that the plaintiffs agreed to do. However, as with the hours spent on the motion, it seems to the court that much of the work involved could more reasonably have been done by a person who does not bill at $500 per hour. The fact that the Whalen & Tusa firm does not have any associates does not render the $24,550 sought by the plaintiffs any more reasonable. Thus, the court will award $15,000 in fees and costs associated with the work. Attorneys of Record on the Current Docket Sheet: In preparing this order, the likelihood of errors in the attorneys of record on the docket sheet has come to the court’s attention. For example, as noted earlier, the docket lists Brian J. Davis as the attorney for Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., but the latest submission by Mr. Davis [#179] does not list that entity among his clients. Further, although Mr. Davis suggests in his list of clients that he represents Cypress Advertising & Promotions, Inc., that fact is not reflected in the docket. Thus, the court directs the attorneys to review the docket immediately upon receipt of this order and to take appropriate steps to corrects any errors. SO ORDERED. [1] According to the plaintiffs, the successor in interest to Brighton Debt Management Services, Ltd. is a company called First Consumer Credit Management Corp., which is allegedly wholly owned by John Puccio and/or Richard Puccio. First Consumer Credit Management Corp. has been named as a defendant in the Second Amended Class Action Complaint. See 12/20/05 Tusa Decl. n.4. [2] Chambers' review of the preparation hours, that is, hours prior to submission of the motion on September 6, 2005, suggests that the approximate time spent was: Tusa - 33.4; Whalen - 48.25; Koppell Firm - 12.4, for a total of 94.05.